Number sources — data & citations

Assessment Defensible, and if anything conservative. The most important reference point is Ginza Kitafuku, an almost identical concept, whose standard published courses run ¥40,000–¥43,000 per person for food alone, with live double crab at ¥58,300 and snow crab at ¥50,000–¥70,000 (all excluding tax, a 10% service charge, and drinks). The deck's course tiers of ¥29,000 / ¥42,000 / ¥57,000 sit squarely in the middle of this real-world range, and even the top-end EMPEROR at ¥57,000 does not reach Kitafuku's ceiling. The deck's weighted-average check of ¥51,680 (fully loaded: course plus drinks plus weight-priced king crab plus raw bar plus room charge) is roughly on par with the upper end of Kitafuku's food-only range (reported by Chowhound at up to approximately ¥49,000), so as a fully loaded figure including ancillary revenue it is consistent rather than aggressive. It is also in line with the top sushi houses (Saito at ¥49,000 / Sugita at ¥50,000, 2024). The ¥29,000 entry tier is reasonable, close to Nobu's top omakase of ¥28,000. There is ample headroom at the top, given Ryugin at ¥90,000–¥170,000. The headline average check of ¥48,000 rounds the bottom-up ¥51,680 down by a further roughly 7%, a conservative presentation that is not overstated, as borne out by the actual data.

Assessment The deck's five figures are largely defensible; the ¥12,000/kg live king crab price warrants a caveat. (1) Russia dependence ~90%: the actual data is roughly 91% (effectively 99% for frozen), and the Fisheries White Paper corroborates that the top three source countries account for 60-90%, making this fully reasonable to slightly conservative. (2) Winter-peak seasonality: well supported, with peak running 1.4-2x (up to ~4x) the cheapest month, so this is reasonable. (3) Live king crab ¥12,000/kg (Toyosu live ¥15,000 x 0.8): Matsubishi explicitly quotes fresh/live at ¥15,000-20,000/kg, so the anchor itself is real and defensible. However, Toyosu's actual B2B wholesale price for foodservice live king crab runs ¥4,000-6,600/kg, and ¥6,000-9,000/kg for mid-size B2C, so the commodity wholesale floor sits well below the deck figure. In other words, ¥12,000/kg is only inline to slightly conservative on the assumption of sourcing top-grade, large, well-filled live crab during peak season; stepping down in size or grade would materially compress cost. (4) Cost ratio 40-47%: this is not a figure backed directly by a single market statistic but an internal operating assumption. That said, if top-grade live king crab anchors the menu, 40-47% is a realistic range depending on the average check. (5) 15 tons/year: on the supply side, on the order of 17,800t (mostly frozen snow crab; king crab alone ~1,419t (~3,698t for the broader frozen-taraba category)) flowed into Japan from Russia in 2024, so sourcing 15t is itself easy relative to market size; the real issue is single-country dependence risk (sanctions / IUU / FX) rather than supply constraint.

Assessment The 70% floor sits at the top of the healthy restaurant occupancy band (65-70%); the all-seat blended figure is 66%, squarely in the middle of that band = standard for the industry. The 1.25 turns is above the fine-dining norm of 1.0 (the deck's two-seating design), and occupancy itself falls within the healthy band. Demand is solid in primary data (590k HNW inbound = JNTO confirmed; Tokyo No.1 in the world with 507 Michelin listings; JFA dinner-restaurant guest count +6.0%). Card guarantees + prepayment on every reservation curb no-shows (¥200B/yr, METI) and the 25-30% inbound cancellation rate (TableCheck), protecting occupancy. The downside is thick with a 47% breakeven.

Assessment A breakeven occupancy of 47% provides robust downside protection. It is derived from fixed costs (labor + rent + depreciation + other) divided by the contribution margin. This sits well below the industry rule-of-thumb seat-occupancy range of 65-70% and the 74.2% city-hotel room-occupancy benchmark, meaning the business turns a profit even if demand is merely in line with the industry average. The design can withstand occupancy falling to 47% should the 70% target be missed; the thick downside cushion is the flip side of the prudent occupancy assumptions.

Assessment Reasonable for the high-end segment. The deck's ~29% beverage share looks high against the NRA all-format average of 21%, but against fine-dining-specific industry primary data (SevenFifty Daily: food at 60-70% of sales, implying beverage at 30-40%), ~29% actually sits at the lower end and is consistent with a Champagne/wine-led luxury venue. The 73% gross margin is also within the range of well-run wine/cocktail programs at 75-80% (Level CFO) and National Tax Agency data on wine producers. Against fine-dining-specific data, the ~29% beverage share is reasonable: above average, but at the low end for the luxury segment.

Assessment Labor is benchmarked against JFC's Western-restaurant 38.1% and the efficient-chain Monogatari Corp 25.0%, and set at about 26% of revenue with a 24-person roster that thickens FOH service. It is funded by the 10% service charge (the conventional service-team revenue source, booked as revenue), with no menu price increase. The primary benchmarks below (JFC Western restaurant / MHLW wages / listed-operator filings) support this level.

Assessment (1) Rent of ¥40,000/tsubo: above the ward-wide average for Minato/Chuo (¥34,000–35,000). The ground-floor street-level market for Ginza (¥60,000–100,000) and Roppongi/Azabu (¥50,000–80,000) runs above ¥40,000, so ¥40,000/tsubo holds on the assumption of securing an upper-floor space, an in-building unit, or an Akasaka-adjacent location; the reference band for a high-visibility street-level frontage is ¥60,000–80,000/tsubo. (2) Rent at 5–7% of sales: at or below the low end of the industry rule of thumb (ideal 7–10%; up to ~20% in reality for premium locations). It is a level achievable at an ultra-premium venue with a high average check and large revenue, which presupposes that the high revenue is realized. (3) Arithmetic consistency: ¥3.2M ÷ 82 tsubo ≈ ¥39,024/tsubo, internally consistent.

Assessment The deck's interior build-out of ¥250M, at roughly ¥2.98–3.13M/tsubo (¥250M ÷ 80–84 tsubo; midpoint ≈¥3.05M/tsubo), is well supported by primary data and real comparables, and is arguably conservative. (1) On a per-tsubo basis it sits roughly 8–21% above the ~$500/sqft range typical of flagship US fine-dining build-outs (≈¥2.58–2.76M/tsubo at FX 145–155), but Tokyo's labor and construction-cost advantage gives more room to execute at international-flagship quality. (2) Real artisanal-interior comparables, such as Dallas's Nuri (designed by AvroKO, with custom stone flooring, hand-painted British wallpaper, and 100-year-old Korean ceramics, at $16M ÷ 9,500 sqft = $1,684/sqft ≈ ¥8.69–9.29M/tsubo) and Nobu Doha's standalone pavilion (≈¥6.16M/tsubo), run roughly 2.0–3.0x the deck's figure, meaning the deck sits well below these luxury ceilings. (3) Against domestic guidance ("upscale restaurants exceeding ¥1M/tsubo"), the deck budgets more than 3x that level, an upward variance consistent with the positioning of a flagship omakase / ultra-premium live-crab venue featuring tableside butchering as showmanship. (4) Concentrating budget on the marquee elements (FF&E, premium materials, custom lighting) is not at odds with the industry-standard allocation of 30–40% to FF&E and 45–55% to kitchen/MEP. Caveat: primary statistics that directly cite per-tsubo costs for domestic flagship-grade fit-outs are scarce (domestic sources only offer figures up to ¥0.4–0.8M for standard and ¥1M+ for upscale), so this assessment relies primarily on the per-tsubo conversion of US and global marquee-venue comparables. Because Tokyo labor costs are lower than in major US cities (NYC/SF at $525–950/sqft), the same budget allows more to be directed toward finishes, which is also a point in the deck's favor.

Assessment ¥1.24-2.98B applies the restaurant EV/EBITDA range observed in the market (5-12x) to post-payoff normalized EBITDA of ¥248M; the midpoint of 8x = ¥1.98B is the base. This is the operating company's equity value, separate from the investor's planned cash recovery (planned cash recovery = loan principal + interest + food-supply gross profit, all performance-linked plan figures). Observed EV/EBITDA multiples for listed restaurant operators run at roughly 10.9x for Skylark and about 11.3x for the listed services sector overall, with all-industry M&A rules of thumb at 6-8x (7.1x median) and the latest M&A comp at a Capstone trailing 8.6x — all consistent with the 5-12x range. The EBITDA definitions are corroborated in the audited filings of each company (Skylark, Toridoll, Monogatari).

Assessment The restaurant insolvency data confirms a record-high stress level. Tokyo Shoko Research reports 1,002 food-service bankruptcies in 2025 (the first time the figure has topped 1,000 in the 30 years since 1996); Teikoku Databank reports 900 restaurant bankruptcies (an all-time high); and "other services" recorded 3,585 cases (a 30-year high). The often-cited claim that "roughly 70% close within three years" is not consistent with government statistics: the SME White Paper puts the post-startup survival rate at 88.1% over three years (all industries), and while food service runs below that, there is no primary data supporting a "70% closure" figure. The credible risk signal is the record number of bankruptcies.